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Litigation is “Just One Tool”: An Annotated Interview with Karin
Baqi, Counsel for the End Immigration Detention Network in
Brown v Canada
KRISTEN LLOYD*
The End Immigration Detention Network (EIDN) was formed as a coalition of migrant
detainees, their family members, and allies, who organized to bring an end to indefinite
immigration detention in Canada. In October 2016, EIDN was granted third party public
interest standing in a constitutional challenge to Canada’s immigration detention regime.
This granted an unprecedented legitimacy to EIDN, and to the rights and lives of
immigration detainees, and should in itself be considered a victory. That said, it was a
moment that would not have arrived without the three years of intensive political
organizing that came before it. This article attempts to situate the legal challenge within
the broader context of the campaign to end indefinite detention, examine the ways it
interacted with the goals of the network, and explore the implications of using litigation
as a tool for social change.

IN OCTOBER 2016, THE END IMMIGRATION DETENTION NETWORK (EIDN) , was granted
third party public interest standing in a constitutional challenge to Canada’s immigration detention
regime. EIDN was formed as a coalition of migrant detainees, their family members, and allies,
who organized to bring an end to indefinite immigration detention in Canada. In his decision to
grant standing to the network, Justice Patrick Gleeson stated that in light of “EIDN’s active and
multi-year engagement in areas of immigration detainee support, research and reporting, [and]
domestic and international advocacy,”1 allowing the network’s participation would “ensure a full
presentation of the issues”2 before the court. This granted an unprecedented legitimacy to EIDN,
and to the rights and lives of immigration detainees, and should in itself be considered a victory.
That said, it was a moment that would not have arrived without the three years of intensive political
organizing that came before it.
On 17 March 2018, I sat down with lawyer and organizer Karin Baqi, who acted as cocounsel for EIDN, to discuss her experience representing the organization before the Federal Court
*

This article was written from my perspective and place of privilege as a white woman, a settler, and a law student,
with full Canadian citizenship status. Through my past involvement with the End Immigration Detention Network I
witnessed the important role that advocates can play in the lives of individual immigration detainees, as well as the
important educative role that those with an understanding of the legal system can play in social movements more
broadly. These experiences motivated me to pursue a legal education, and have also informed this article. I would like
to acknowledge the irony of privileging the voice of a lawyer in a discussion of a legal challenge that intended to
amplify the voices of those with lived experiences in the immigration detention system. I was uncomfortable asking
a former or current detainee to participate in the creation of this piece without being able to compensate them for their
time, especially because, unlike with participation in the legal challenge itself, there exists no real or tangible benefits
to contributing to a piece such as this. As such, my intent is not to focus on the experience of life in the immigration
detention system, but rather on the role that litigation can play in moving forward the demands of social movements,
such as those of the campaign to end indefinite immigration detention in Canada. That said, I am open to criticism in
regard to these choices.
1
Brown v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (7 October 2016), Ottawa, FC IMM-364-15 (Motion for
Public Interest Standing or Intervener Status) at para 16 [“EIDN Motion”].
2
Ibid at para 23.
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in Brown v Canada.3 Baqi has practised immigration and poverty law for the past decade, and has
been involved with various grassroots campaigns for migrant justice, including EIDN and the
Immigration Legal Committee of the Law Union of Ontario. She represented EIDN in her capacity
as a staff lawyer at the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario, alongside Swathi Sekhar, a Torontobased immigration and refugee lawyer and advocate for migrant and prisoner rights. In what
follows, I attempt to situate EIDN’s involvement in the Brown legal challenge within the broader
context of its campaign to end indefinite detention, examine the ways it interacted with the goals
of the network, and explore the implications of using litigation as a tool for social change.4

I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN CANADA
During the tenure of the Harper Conservative government, Canada jailed over 80,000 migrants.5
In 2017, the year Brown was heard, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) held 6251
migrants in detention.6 Over four hundred of these individuals were classified as “long-term
detainees,”7 meaning they were held for ninety days or more in conditions “largely
indistinguishable from the incarceration of prisoners convicted of crimes.”8 Included among those
detained by Canada for immigration purposes were children,9 asylum seekers fleeing their
countries of origin,10 and permanent residents who knew no other home than Canada.11

3

Brown v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2017 FC 710 [Brown].
Where no specific reference is given this article is informed by my conversation with Karin Baqi or my own
involvement with EIDN.
5
Harsha Walia & Omar Chu, “Nearly 100,000 Migrants in Canada Jailed Without Charge” (2015), NeverHome.ca,
online: <neverhome.ca/detention/> [perma.cc/9YHH-62VD]. This represents the number of individuals detained
between 2006 and 2014.
6
Canada Border Services Agency, “Arrests, Detentions and Removals: Annual Detention Statistics- 2012–2017,” (28
March 2018), online: <cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/detent/stat-2012-2017-eng.html> [perma.cc/D2WS-TCAD]
[CBSA, “Arrests, Detentions and Removals”].
7
Ibid.
8
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present (Halifax & Winnipeg:
Fernwood Publishing, 2017) at 167.
9
See e.g. Rachel Browne, “What Are Babies Doing Behind Bars in Canada?,” Maclean’s (18 June 2015), online:
<macleans.ca/news/canada/what-are-babies-doing-behind-bars-in-canada/>
[https://perma.cc/R5L7-SG3U]
Cameroonian asylum seeker Glory Anawa gave birth to her son Alpha while detained at the Toronto Immigration
Holding Centre; he spent the first two years of his life in detention. In November 2017, Public Safety Minister Ralph
Goodale issued a Ministerial Direction to the CBSA that stipulated minors should only be held in detention as a
measure of last resort and that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration (Public Safety Canada,
Ministerial Direction to the Canada Border Services Agency: Minors in Canada’s Immigration Detention System (6
November 2017). The number of minors in immigration detention in Canada decreased by nearly 50 per cent between
2014 and 2019, with 118 minors detained by the CBSA in the 2018/2019 fiscal year (Canada Border Services Agency,
“Arrests, Detentions and Removals: Annual Detention Statistics- 2012–2019,” (20 August 2019), online: <www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/security-securite/detent/stat-2012-2019-eng.html> [perma.cc/K85C-GLFP]..
10
Maynard, supra note 8 at 166.
11
This was the reality of the Applicant Alvin Brown in the Federal Court challenge that is the focus of this article (see
Brown v Canada, 2017 FC 710 (Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Fact and Law) at para 10 [Applicant’s Memo])
as well as for EIDN organizer and affiant Kyon Ferril (see Brown v Canada, 2017 FC 710 (Third Party’s Further
Memorandum of Fact and Law) at para 20 [EIDN’s Memo]).
4
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The CBSA, “under clear parameters to ensure the integrity of the immigration system and
to ensure public safety,”12 has been empowered by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness to perform the arrest and detention duties authorized by Canadian immigration
legislation, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its corresponding Regulations.13
CBSA officers can detain foreign nationals or permanent residents seeking admission to Canada
at official ports of entry.14 Further, they can arrest any non-citizen, anywhere in the country, if
their identity is in question,15 or if reasonable grounds exist to believe they are inadmissible to
Canada and they pose a danger to the public or are unlikely to appear for removal.16 While Canada
does not release data on the race or ethnic identities of those arrested or detained by the CBSA,
Robyn Maynard writes that racialized, and in particular Black, migrants are subject to heightened
surveillance and suspicion, and face an increased risk of “discovery, apprehension, detention and
deportation.”17 Indeed, many high-profile immigration detainees, including the individual
Applicant in the challenge discussed herein, fit this profile.18
Non-citizens charged with a criminal offence are frequently found inadmissible to
Canada,19 receiving a “double punishment”20—a criminal sentence, followed by immigration
detention and possible deportation—while those convicted of criminal offences who have full
citizenship status are released after any period of incarceration to which they are sentenced. This
creates a reality whereby “the bureaucratic difference between holding permanent resident status
and full citizenship creates a staggering divergence in one’s life trajectory.”21 Again, racialized
Canada Border Services Agency, “CBSA’s New National Immigration Detention Framework: A Summary of the
Report of the Framework and Stakeholder Roundtable Discussions,” online: <cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agencyagence/consult/consultations/nidf-cnmdi/menu-eng.html> [perma.cc/KRU6-MAJ3] [CBSA, “New Framework”].
13
Ralph Goodale, “Delegation of Authority and Designations of Officers by the Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Regulations,” online: <cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/actreg-loireg/delegation/irpa-lipr-2016-07eng.html> [perma.cc/F6W4-RTSX]; Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, ss 54–61 [IRPA];
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, ss 244–250 [Regulations].
14
Hanna Gros & Paloma van Groll, “We Have No Rights:” Arbitrary Imprisonment and Cruel Treatment of Migrants
with Mental Health Issues in Canada (Toronto: International Human Rights Program, University of Toronto Faculty
of Law, 2015) at 46; Petra Molnar & Stephanie J Silverman, “Research Findings from Immigration Detention:
Arguments for Increasing Access to Justice” (15 August 2016), Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced
Migration Studies Blog, online: <carfms.org/blog/research-findings-from-immigration-detention-arguments-forincreasing-access-to-justice> [perma.cc/48W5-8GD2].
15
IRPA, supra note 13, s 55(2)(b).
16
Ibid, s 55(1)–(2). A number of factors set out in the Regulations, including compliance with previous immigration
conditions, inform the assessment of whether a detainee falls into the category of flight risk, danger to the public, or
a foreign national whose identity has not been established: Regulations, supra note 13, ss 244–47.
17
Maynard, supra note 8 at 165.
18
See e.g. the cases cited below at footnote 26.
19
Permanent residents and foreign nationals who receive a prison sentence of over six months are inadmissible to
Canada on grounds of serious criminality: IRPA, supra note 13, s 36(1)(a). Foreign nationals are also inadmissible for
less serious criminality pursuant to IRPA, supra note 13, s 36(2)(a); See also Maynard, supra note 8 at 173; Again,
this was the reality of both Alvin Brown (see Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 11) and Kyon Ferril (see
EIDN’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 20) as well as many other detainees involved with EIDN.
20
Maynard, supra note 8 at 173.
21
Ibid at 175. Many detainees involved with the campaign to end detention arrived in Canada as children and were
later deported to places they could barely remember, where they no longer had family or other support structures, as
a result of having faced criminal charges in Canada. While not involved in the campaign, the case of Abdoul Abdi
provides illustration. See e.g. Samer Muscati & Audrey Macklin, “Abdoul Abdi case: A Test of Canada’s Commitment
to Rules and Compassion,” The Globe and Mail (16 January 2018), online: <theglobeandmail.com/opinion/abdoulabdi-case-a-test-of-canadas-commitment-to-rules-and-compassion/article37616825/> [perma.cc/2JA5-CPYT].
12
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migrants face this threat most acutely, as race “and Blackness in particular, largely determines who
is seen, caught, arrested, charged, found guilty and sentenced for breaking the law.”22
Bodies within the United Nations have repeatedly criticized Canada’s detention regime for
violating international human rights law.23 While the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees recommends that “maximum periods of detention … be set in national legislation,”24
Canada remains one of the only Western nations without such a limit,25 and individuals have
languished behind bars for upwards of a decade as a result.26 Detentions are reviewed by a member
of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) within the first fortyeight hours after an individual is detained, again in the seven days following the initial review, and
then every subsequent thirty days.27 However, the process has been criticized as flawed and
arbitrary by detainee advocates, and release rates vary dramatically across regions and among
individual board members.28
The absence of a limit wreaks havoc on the mental wellbeing of detainees. Karin Baqi said
that for many, “the most traumatizing part of [detention] was never knowing when you would get
out,” and it is well-documented that for migrants, a population already vulnerable to mental health

22

Maynard, supra note 8 at 172.
UNWGAD, 69th Sess, 15th Mtg, UN Doc A/HRC/WGAD/2014/15 (2014) at paras 23–26 (The Working Group
found Canada’s seven-year detention of Cameroonian national Michael Mvogo unnecessary and arbitrary, and a
violation of international human rights law); UNCERD, 21st–23rd Year, 2580th–2582nd Mtgs, UN Doc
CERD/C/CAN/CO/21-23 (2017) at para 34 (among other recommendations, the committee called on Canada to
establish a legal time limit for detentions). See also Nicholas Keung, “UN Chastises Canada Over Immigration
Detention, Including Un-deportable Man Jailed 8 Years,” Toronto Star (24 July 2014), online:
<thestar.com/news/immigration/2014/07/24/un_chastises_canada_over_immigration_detention_including_undeport
able_man_jailed_8_years.html> [perma.cc/4FQP-A9DX]; Nicholas Keung, “UN Calls Out Ottawa Over Lengthy
Immigration
Detention
Stays,”
Toronto
Star
(1
September
2017),
online:
<thestar.com/news/immigration/2017/08/31/un-calls-out-ottawa-over-lengthy-immigration-detention-stays.html>
[perma.cc/S7H7-N3CM].
24
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to
the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention (2012), Guideline 6 at 26, online:
<refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html> [perma.cc/6WB3-NAJ4].
25
Molnar & Silverman, supra note 14; Syed Hussan, Indefinite, Arbitrary and Unfair: The Truth About Immigration
Detention in Canada (Toronto, End Immigration Detention Network, 2014) at 2; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at
paras 69–73. The United States and European Union member states have either legislated or court-imposed limits on
detention; some are hard caps and others can be extended in exceptional circumstances.
26
See e.g. Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 14 (Alvin Brown was detained by CBSA for five years before his
deportation); Brendan Kennedy, “Jailed Seven Years by Canada, Kashif Ali Now Walks Free,” Toronto Star (28 April
2017), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/2017/04/28/jailed-seven-years-by-canada-kashif-ali-now-walks-free.html>
[perma.cc/L4DP-3LWF] (at the time of his release following a successful habeas corpus application in April 2017,
Kashif Ali was the longest-serving detainee currently behind bars); Brendan Kennedy, “Immigration Detainee
Ebrahim Toure Marks Five Years Without Freedom: ‘What’s Going On With Me is Not Right,’” Toronto Star (25
February 2018), online: <thestar.com/news/canada/2018/02/25/immigration-detainee-ebrahim-toure-marks-fiveyears-without-freedom-whats-going-on-with-me-is-not-right.html> [perma.cc/SU7R-AUTB] (Ebrahim Toure was
detained for over five years and was the longest-serving detainee in Canada at the time of his release); Geoffrey York,
“Freed From Canadian Detention, South African Man Left in Limbo,” The Globe and Mail (15 June 2016), online:
<theglobeandmail.com/news/world/freed-from-canadian-detention-south-african-man-left-inlimbo/article30462108/> [perma.cc/HT76-U9PM](Victor Vinnetou, believed to be a South African anti-Apartheid
hero, spent eleven years in immigration detention as Canada sought to establish his identity).
27
IRPA, supra note 13, ss 57(1)(2).
28
Hussan, supra note 25 at 3, 14–15.
23

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol33/iss1/7

137

Lloyd: Litigation is “Just One Tool”: An Annotated Interview with Karin

issues,29 even short-term detention can be incredibly damaging.30 Approximately one-third of
immigration detainees are held in provincially operated criminal detention centres.31 Many of these
are maximum-security facilities,32 where the deterorioration of mental health is arguably much
worse for the immigration detainees held within them.33 Concerningly, once detainees are
transferred to a provincial prison, jurisdiction over the environment in which they are held, as well
as responsibility for their health and safety, becomes murky.34 Baqi explained that detainees held
in provincial facilities face added hardships related to a “lack of proper healthcare, lack of proper
access to families [and] phone calls, [and] hygiene issues.”

II. THE CAMPAIGN TO END INDEFINITE DETENTION
On 17 September 2013, 191 migrant detainees began a historic hunger strike to protest the
conditions of their imprisonment at the Central East Correctional Centre (CECC) in Lindsay,
Ontario. Predominantly Black and Brown men, these detainees had recently been transferred from
facilities in Toronto to a maximum-security prison more than two hours away, effectively isolating
them from family and legal supports. Their original grievances centered around prison conditions:
a lack of access to medical care; poor quality of food; frequent lockdowns; and the exorbitant cost
of phone calls.35 Eight detainees continued the hunger strike for several weeks and were placed in
solitary confinement as a result.36 However, beyond the first few days, media coverage of this
unprecedented event was almost non-existent.
From the hunger strike emerged a sustained, detainee-led political campaign, which
organized around the following four demands:
(1) Freedom for the wrongly jailed: Release all migrant detainees who have been held
for longer than 90 days.
29

Gros & van Groll, supra note 14 at 20.
Ibid at 18, 20–23; Maynard, supra note 8 at 167.
31
Laura Track & Josh Paterson, Oversight at the Border: A Model for Independent Accountability at the Canada
Border Services Agency (Vancouver: BC Civil Liberties Association, 2017) at 16; Gros & van Groll, supra note 14 at
75.
32
Maynard, supra note 8 at 167.
33
Gros & van Groll, supra note 14 at 22.
34
Ibid at 5, 7, 89; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 50, 52.
35
End Immigration Detention Network, “FAQ,” online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/faq/> [perma.cc/A8HW8PCG]; End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Nearly 200 Immigration Detainees Striking Over
Prison Conditions” (23 September 2013), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2013/09/23/advisory-nearly-200immigration-detainees-striking-after-being-moved-from-toronto-to-jail-in-lindsay-ontario/> [perma.cc/J5D2-R8YT];
Nicholas Keung, “Immigration Detainees in Lindsay Jail Stage Protest and Hunger Strike,” Toronto Star (20
September 2013), online:
<thestar.com/news/immigration/2013/09/20/immigration_detainees_stage_protest_and_hunger_strike.html>
[perma.cc/B5V7-S4J4]; Nicholas Keung, “Immigration Detainees Vow to Continue Hunger Strike”, Toronto Star (25
September 2013), online:
<thestar.com/news/immigration/2013/09/25/immigration_detainees_vow_to_continue_hunger_strike.html>
[perma.cc/GM7Z-HX3Z].
36
End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Jailed migrants in critical condition as historic strike enters
Day 15” (1 October 2013), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2013/10/01/259/> [perma.cc/59R5-RWD4]; End
Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Denied justice and in jail, man petitions against Canada at the UN”
(23 October 2013), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2013/10/23/mvogounadvisory/> [perma.cc/3XWTMHL8].
30
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(2) End arbitrary and indefinite detention: If removal cannot happen within 90 days,
immigration detainees must be released. Limits on detention periods are recommended
by the United Nations, and are the law in the United States and the European Union.37
(3) No maximum-security holds: Immigration detainees should not be held in
maximum security provincial jails; must have access to basic services and be close to
family members.
(4) Overhaul the adjudication process: Give migrants fair and full access to judicial
review, legal aid, bail programs and pro bono representation.38
Over the past several years, the End Immigration Detention Network has held large-scale
demonstrations in tandem with protests inside prison walls,39 released a damning report showing
the arbitrary nature of Canada’s immigration detention system,40 operated a free phone line for
detainees, organized visits to detention centres, lobbied politicians, and engaged in public
education.41 Distressingly, the campaign to end detention has also been galvanized by several
deaths in CBSA custody. Since 2000, at least fifteen immigration detainees have died,42 and each
of the lives lost since EIDN’s inception has added great urgency and strength to the detainees’
original demands.43
37

See footnote 25, supra, which explains that the legal limits on detention in the E.U. and the U.S. are not unqualified
and can be extended in exceptional circumstances.
38
End Immigration Detention Network, “Demands,” online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/demands/>
[perma.cc/KS5J-2UCT].
39
End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Immigration detainees re-start hunger fast; hundreds rally
outside Lindsay jail” (12 December 2013), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2013/12/12/media-advisoryimmigration-detainees-re-start-hunger-fast-hundreds-rally-outside-lindsay-jail/> [perma.cc/23M9-8CRD]; No One Is
Illegal, “Rally at Lindsay Jail Calls for End to Indefinite Immigration Detention” (17 December 2013), Rabble (blog),
online:
<rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/no-one-illegal/2013/12/rally-lindsay-jail-calls-end-to-indefinite-immigrationdetenti> [perma.cc/3AZ9-4CYG]; End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Jailed immigrants begin
historic boycott of ‘Detention Reviews’” (2 June 2014), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2014/06/02/jailedimmigrants-begin-historic-boycott-of-detention-reviews/> [perma.cc/JBT8-U79C]; Daniel Tseghay, “Boycotting
Immigration
Detention
in
Canada”
(9
June
2014),
Rabble
(blog),
online:
<rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/mainlander/2014/06/boycotting-immigration-detention-canada> [perma.cc/B6RL-2Z4G].
40
Hussan, supra note 25.
41
EIDN’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 5.
42
Amara McLaughlin, “Death of Woman, 50, Detained by Canada Border Agency in Milton, Renews Calls for More
Oversight,” CBC News (2 November 2017), online: <cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/death-of-woman-50-detained-bycanada-border-agency-in-milton-renews-calls-for-more-oversight-1.4384996> [perma.cc/497V-XDMA]; Brendan
Kennedy, “Caged by Canada: Part 1,” Toronto Star (17 March 2017), online: <projects.thestar.com/caged-by-canadaimmigration-detention/part-1/> [perma.cc/RH4U-PWNV] (The CBSA has not released the names or cause of several
of the deaths that have occurred in the agency’s custody).
43
End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “End Immigration Detention Network responds to death in
immigration custody” (12 June 2015), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2015/06/12/end-immigrationdetention-network-responds-to-death-in-immigration-custody/>
[perma.cc/7GLM-7L8R];
End
Immigration
Detention Network, Media Release, “Second death in immigration custody in one week reignites calls for detentions
overhaul” (15 March 2016), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2016/03/15/second-death-in-immigrationcustody-in-one-week-reignites-calls-for-detentions-overhaul/> [perma.cc/2FJU-DDXC]; following a series of deaths
in detention in early 2016, scores of healthcare and legal professionals took a public stance and added their voices to
EIDN’s calls to stop the detention of migrants: see Nicholas Keung, “Healthcare Providers Urge Ontario to End
Immigration
Detention,”
Toronto
Star
(17
May
2016),
online:
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In July 2016, following years of government inaction in the wake of deaths and public
condemnation, over fifty detainees began a new hunger strike and demanded to meet with Public
Safety Minister Ralph Goodale.44 The strike lasted eighteen days, and while the Minister refused
to meet with detainees he could no longer ignore the political pressure they created. On 15 August
2016 the Federal Government announced a new “National Immigration Detention Framework,”
which included a 138-million-dollar investment to upgrade Canada’s immigration detention
facilities.45
The announcement failed to address the systemic issues and rights violations EIDN had
raised throughout the preceding several years, and the network took issue with the Liberals’ choice
to respond to a “hunger strike denouncing gross human rights violation[s] in detention”46 by
investing even more money into detention. Though the fight to end indefinite detention is far from
over, in Baqi’s opinion, Goodale’s announcement is symptomatic of EIDN’s biggest victory—
securing immigration detention’s place on the national agenda:
[I]n 2013, when the hunger strike began, nobody was really talking about indefinite
immigration detention … . [In] the press, or even in immigration law circles, they
weren’t talking about this as being a systemic problem, or a public interest issue … . I
do believe that but for EIDN, indefinite immigration detention wouldn’t have had the
traction it’s had in Canada, at all.
It was against this backdrop of political organizing and advocacy that EIDN became
involved in the Federal Court challenge to Canada’s immigration detention regime.

III. CHALLENGING THE DETENTION REGIME IN COURT:
BROWN v CANADA

<thestar.com/news/immigration/2016/05/17/healthcare-providers-urge-ontario-to-end-immigration-detention.html>;
[perma.cc/6MJV-553L]; Nicholas Keung, “Lawyers Join Doctors and Nurses in ‘End Immigration Detention’
Campaign,” Toronto Star (28 May 2016), online: <thestar.com/news/immigration/2016/05/28/lawyers-join-doctorsand-nurses-in-end-immigration-detention-campaign.html> [perma.cc/G9BD-LLFD].
44
End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Immigration detainees refusing food to call for end to
indefinite
maximum-security
detention”
(11
July
2016),
online:
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uO_11g2VNfyfddefFtHOc-CN1h-dkqQHjkcLTmkVGmc/edit>;
Muriel
Draaisma, “Immigration Detainees on Hunger Strike Demand Meeting With Goodale,” CBC News (12 July 2016),
online:
<cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/immigration-detainees-hunger-strike-ontario-prisons-ralph-goodale1.3676576> [perma.cc/9S43-SRQB]; Geraldine Malone, “Immigration Detainees Go on Hunger Strike to Highlight
Canada’s
Disturbing
Detention
Policy,”
Vice
News
(12
July
2016),
online:
<vice.com/en_ca/article/yvek7v/immigration-detainees-go-on-hunger-strike-to-highlight-canadas-disturbingdetention-policy> [perma.cc/E5QD-HFGC].
45
Canada Border Services Agency, Media Release, “Minister Goodale introduces new initiatives for a better, fairer
immigration
detention
system”
(15
August
2016),
online:
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A. BACKGROUND
Alvin Brown is a Jamaican national who arrived in Canada as a young child in the early 1980s and
became a permanent resident.47 As Baqi described, “[h]is entire life was here, his family, all of his
connections.” Mr. Brown was found criminally inadmissible to Canada and ordered deported,48
however, before being removed to Jamaica in 2016 he was detained by the CBSA in maximumsecurity jails for a total of five years. The sole impediment to Mr. Brown’s deportation was an
inability to obtain travel documents from his country of origin, yet every month his detention was
sustained by board members who could find no reason to depart from previous findings of risk and
order him released back into his community in Canada.49 “His status was lost and then he found
himself in indefinite detention, where throughout the period of his incarceration … no one could
tell him when he would be released or removed,” Baqi explained. Indefinite detention took a heavy
toll on the mental health of Mr. Brown, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia while in CBSA
custody.50 Speaking of his experience, he recounted: “It was horrible, I would have rather been
dead than detained, not knowing when I would be released.”51
During a monthly review in August 2014, Mr. Brown challenged the constitutionality of
his detention, arguing that at more than three years in length, it violated his rights under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.52 He also challenged the legality of the detention
regime’s enabling legislation,53 eventually bringing the matter to Federal Court.54 Baqi explained
that for EIDN, a major objective of joining the challenge was to be able to raise the campaign’s
four main demands before the courts; Mr. Brown’s challenge to the IRPA itself provided an
opportunity to extend EIDN’s political organizing into the legal realm.

B. EIDN AS THIRD PARTY
As mentioned above, EIDN’s motion to be granted public interest standing as a third party was
granted in October 2016.55 In Baqi’s opinion, the network would not have been granted third party
status without the sustained political organizing that preceded the court challenge, however she
admits she was surprised when EIDN was granted leave to participate. Baqi remembers thinking:
“We don’t have legitimacy, immigration detainees’ lives don’t have legitimacy [in the eyes of the
law], so how are we ever going to get this?” As such, she views EIDN’s third party status as a “big
victory,” and a recognition that “these are legal issues that [the Federal Court] should consider.”
In order to be named as a public interest party in the litigation commenced by Mr. Brown,
EIDN had to demonstrate that the following factors, laid out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
Brown, supra note 3 at para 9; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 10.
Ibid; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 9–15.
49
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 15, 16. Brown, supra note 3 at paras 16–18.
50
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 18.
51
Quoted in End Immigration Detention Network, Media Release, “Federal court questions border enforcement on
constitutionality of indefinite detention” (15 May 2017), online: <endimmigrationdetention.com/2017/05/15/mediarelease-federal-court-questions-border-enforcement-on-constitutionality-of-indefinite-detention/>
[https://perma.cc/6LJR-W86D].
52
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 19; Brown, supra note 3 at para 19.
53
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54
Brown, supra note 3 at para 25.
55
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decision in Downtown Eastside, were satisfied: “(1) whether there is a serious justiciable issue
raised; (2) whether the plantiff has a real stake or a genuine interest in it; and (3) whether, in all
the circumstances, the proposed suit is a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the
courts.”56 Gleeson J found that EIDN easily satisfied the first two factors, which the Respondent
Minister did not dispute.57
At the time EIDN brought its motion seeking standing as a party, Mr. Brown had already
been deported to Jamaica.58 As such, with respect to the third Downtown Eastside factor, EIDN
submitted that a grant of standing would allow the network to continue the proceeding on Mr.
Brown’s behalf should the matter be found moot as a result of his removal.59 The Respondent
argued instead that it would be most reasonable and effective for another long-term immigration
detainee to bring this issue before the Court.60 While Gleeson J agreed that, in theory, there exists
a number of individual litigants who could bring a similar challenge before the Court as of right,61
he rejected the Respondent’s argument and noted the many practical obstacles that would likely
prevent another long-term detainee from bringing forth a challenge to the legality of the
immigration detention regime.62 Importantly, EIDN’s presence as a third party led Justice Simon
Fothergill, who presided over the challenge in Federal Court, to exercise his discretion to hear the
case in the broader public interest, “notwithstanding that it [had] likely become moot due to Mr.
Brown’s removal to Jamaica.”63
While the facts of Mr. Brown’s challenge focused on his own experience, as a party to the
proceedings EIDN was able to bring a “cross section of detainee experiences” before the court.
EIDN’s evidence consisted of the experiences of both men and women who had been detained at
CECC and the Toronto Immigration Holding Centre, as well as family members of detainees.64
Many of EIDN’s affiants were organizers in the campaign who wanted to share their experiences
of detention.

C. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Counsel for EIDN and Mr. Brown worked in close collaboration with one another, and together
argued that the legislative scheme65 governing Canada’s immigration detention regime violates
sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Charter.66
The parties argued that the lack of a statutory limit to the length of detention leads to
situations of unconstitutional, indefinite detention,67 in violation of both section 7, which protects
“the right to life, liberty and security of the person,”68 and section 9 of the Charter, which protects

56

Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 at
para 37 [Downtown Eastside].
57
EIDN Motion, supra note 1 at paras 14-16.
58
Brown, supra note 3 at para 18.
59
EIDN Motion, supra note 1 at paras 13, 17.
60
Ibid at para 17.
61
Ibid at para 20.
62
Ibid at para 23.
63
Brown, supra note 3 at paras 33–38.
64
See Brown, supra note 3 at paras 52–72, 92.
65
IRPA, supra note 13 at ss 57 and 58; Regulations, supra note 13 at ss 244–48.
66
Brown, supra note 3 at para 30.
67
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 23, 74; Brown, supra note 3 at para 142.
68
Charter, supra note 52 at s 7; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 41–44, 54–59, 77–90.
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against arbitrary detention.69 Furthermore, they argued that the legislation’s silence in relation to
conditions and location of detention also violate section 7 liberty interests,70 because as Baqi notes,
“the CBSA ends up having unfettered discretion to do whatever they want, and the law doesn’t
constrain the state’s power;” there exists no way to ensure that detention conditions are reflective
of a detainee’s actual level of risk, which the parties therefore argued is not minimally impairing
in accordance with the Charter.71
EIDN and Mr. Brown also submitted that the detention regime violates section 12 of the
Charter,72 which protects against cruel and unusual punishment, as a result of the length,
indeterminacy, and what Baqi describes as the “actual material circumstances and conditions under
which people are detained.” The parties argued that the section 12 infringment stems from:
detention conditions, which especially in provincial prisons, are de facto punitive; the
psychological impact of indefinite detention; and, the inadequate healthcare provided to
detainees.73 In support of this argument, EIDN presented evidence about jail conditions, including
frequent lockdowns, lack of proper healthcare, hygiene issues, lack of access to family visits and
phone calls, and a lack of programming and rehabilitative supports.
The parties’ final central argument related to the lack of fairness and procedural protections
built into the detention review process.74 Counsel argued that a “process in which the state is de
facto and unjustifiably relieved of its burden of proof to show continuing grounds for detention is
unfair and thus contrary to the principles of fundamental justice,”75 and leaves detainees with the
near impossible task of justifying their own release.76 Baqi illustrates the reverse onus that exists
in practice, showing how past behaviour can become prima facie evidence that a detainee is a
flight risk or a danger to the public:
[I]f you have a past conviction, [the Minister] can just say “you’re a danger.” Even if
there’s been a big passage of time they are still able to rely on that one conviction, and
there’s nothing you can do to overcome that, especially if there’s no rehabilitative
programming to show you’ve been rehabilitated, and that happens all the time. So,
we’re saying there’s a reverse onus here, and that’s not minimally restrictive [on one’s
liberty interests].
Adding to the lack of fairness, counsel argued that because the legislation does not
require the Minister to provide evidence or disclosure at detention reviews, detainees are
precluded from knowing the case against them and from meaningfully challenging the
allegations asserted to justify their continued detention.77
The parties sought to have the entire detention regime declared unconstitutional. In
the alternative however, Mr. Brown asked for a number of specific remedies, including the
imposition of a six-month presumptive limit and an eighteen-month hard limit on
Charter, supra note 52 at s 9; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 54–90. Brown, supra note 3 at para 115.
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 41–44; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 114, 129.
71
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 41.
72
Charter, supra note 52 at s 12; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 153–54; Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 24,
91–114.
73
Brown, supra note 3 at paras 153–54.
74
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 25–40; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 114, 116.
75
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 27.
76
Ibid at paras 31–40; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 114, 116.
77
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at paras 25, 28–30; Brown, supra note 3 at paras 114, 121.
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detentions.78 For its part, EIDN sought to secure a ninety-day limit on detentions,79 to reflect
the demands that emerged from the original detainee hunger strike.

D. RESULT
Unsurprisingly to the parties, the outcome of Justice Fothergill’s July 2017 decision was not
favourable. Mr. Brown’s application was refused, however in doing so, Fothergill J opted
not to meaningfully engage with the Charter issues raised by EIDN and Mr. Brown. Instead,
he suggested the parties’ concerns were the result of a “maladministration”80 of the IRPA
and that when “properly interpreted and applied,”81 the legislation is constitutionally
compliant.
Fothergill J found that “many of the legal principles that inform the constitutional
analysis in this case [to be] well-established.”82 Throughout the decision he cites
jurisprudence and rules that articulate the requirements of lawful detention and a
constitutionally compliant review process,83 and repeatedly states that the issues raised by
Mr. Brown and EIDN are “not an indication that the statutory scheme is itself
unconstitutional.”84 Thus, instead of grappling with the abundance of evidence put forth by
the parties of legislative deficienices and Charter infringments occurring under the auspices
of the immigration detention regime, he relies on the existing jurisprudence to reaffirm the
constitutionaliy of the legislative framework.85
In Baqi’s opinion, the decision could have been worse because, as opposed to
explicitly rejecting them, “the judge did not address many of the arguments,” leaving room
on appeal to raise and rely on the Charter arguments that were not squarely addressed in the
Federal Court decision. Fothergill J determined that the Federal Court of Appeal had “yet to
consider whether the Charter imposes a requirement that detention for immigration purposes
not exceed a prescribed period of time,” and certified a question for appeal to that effect.86
Shortly before the publication of this piece, the Federal Court of Appeal released its
decision wherein it upheld the constitutionality of the immigration detention regime87 and
again attributed acknowledged deficiencies in the regime to maladministration and not the
legislation itself. In its decision, the Court of Appeal lays out in further detail the
requirements of a detention that complies with both the Charter and administrative law
principles,88 stating that “[a]lthough the appellants’ challenge to the validity of the sections
fails, many of their arguments are vindicated by what is said in these reasons concerning
Applicant’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 119. Brown, supra note 3 at paras 31, 143.
EIDN’s Memo, supra note 11 at para 111; Brown, supra note 3 at para 143.
80
Brown, supra note 3 at paras 120, 127, 156.
81
Brown, supra note 3 at para 156.
82
Ibid at para 161.
83
Ibid at paras 119–20, 124–28, 131, 134 –35, 138, 151–52, 155–56.
84
Ibid at para 127.
85
Fothergill J concluded his decision by rearticulating a list of the “minimum requirements of lawful detention for
immigration purposes under the IRPA and the Regulations” (Brown, supra note 3 at para 159).
86
The certified question is as follows: “Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 impose a requirement that detention for
immigration purposes not exceed a prescribed period of time, after which it is presumptively unconstitutional, or a
maximum period, after which release is mandatory?” (Brown, supra note 3 at para 162).
87
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88
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what judges conducting detention reviews must consider.”89 The Court of Appeal rejected
the arguments of the parties that IRPA is rendered unconstitutional because it does not
impose a maximum period of detention or expressly state that there can be no detention
absent a reasonably foreseeable prospect of removal;90 having found the detention regime
not to infringe sections 7 and 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal concludes that: “No
principle of statutory interpretation requires that, to ensure constitutionality, the legislature
must state that which the law already requires.”91 In regards to section 12 of the Charter, the
Court of Appeal found that the “evidence of conditions of detention falls far short of the
threshold of cruel and unusual punishment set by the Supreme Court.”92

IV. LITIGATION AS A TOOL FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
The ability of litigation to generate meaningful social change has long been debated,93 and it is
difficult to define “success” when legal challenges are used to seek such change.94 Skeptics worry
that in asking for recognition of rights, social movement actors acquiesce to the court’s power to
determine which human beings have value, and which do not.95 Some critical legal scholars argue
this creates a harmful reliance on the state, thereby “weaken[ing] the power of a popular
movement,”96 while at the same time “lending legitimacy to [a] political system”97 that a
movement might fundamentally oppose.
Others argue that to be skeptical of legally granted rights and legitimacy “is, in large
measure, a luxury that is only truly available for those who already enjoy the experience of
rights.”98 The granting of legal rights can allow “a group’s experiences [to] acquire public value
for the first time,”99 providing momentum to movements as actors begin to “perceive their
discontent as worthy of political attention.”100 Moreover, the acceptance of an issue as justiciable
by the courts acts as an acknowledgement that a wrong has occurred, and that a remedy is
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required.101 As Fay Faraday argues, “the power to name … experiences as injuries has more than
symbolic importance.”102
A. EIDN’S LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
Unsurprisingly, EIDN’s experience did not demonstrate litigation to be a definitively positive or
negative force in advancing the demands of the campaign. Knowing they were entering “a very
conservative venue,” Baqi acknowledged that EIDN did not have “many expectations of being
successful in the Federal Court.” Though she understood they would likely need to appeal the
decision before finding legal success, the network was not solely interested in victory as defined
in narrow legalistic terms: “[O]bviously we wanted to win … but for us this legal strategy was
going to be just one tool in an overall strategy.” Engaging in litigation allowed EIDN to shed light
on the experiences and demands of immigration detainees, however, as Baqi made clear
throughout our interview, the intent was always to bring forth those voices both inside and outside
the courtroom:
Part of the reason we did the litigation was also to raise awareness … . EIDN planned
to do a lot of public relations work and media work around it and give the opportunity
to detainees and family members to speak to it, and it was just more likely to get picked
up [by the media] if it was in court.

1. BENEFITS TO THE CAMPAIGN
Asserting legal rights in the courtroom can act as a platform to “express the politics, vision, and
demands of a social movement;”103 regardless of the success of a legal challenge, movement actors
are provided the opportunity to articulate their own political analyses.104 The highly publicized
Federal Court challenge allowed EIDN to engage extensively with media, and with the legitimacy
of third party standing, the network was in a position to influence public consciousness, frame the
discourse surrounding the legal challenge, and define the problems associated with immigration
detention, exemplifying one way that “rights litigation is not antithetical to grassroots organizing
but complementary.”105
EIDN’s participation in the Federal Court challenge provided a focal point for detainees to
rally around: “[A] lot of detainees were very interested in the case, and what was amazing was that
so many former detainees and their family members did show up for those two days in court, and
a lot of detainees did get more involved in the campaign as a result.” Despite what was, in a legal
sense, a negative outcome, Baqi explained that being able to share their stories and see their
experiences taken seriously before the court empowered those involved: “[P]eople certainly told
us that they felt some sort of vindication or support while the hearing was happening, for these
arguments to be raised.”
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The highly publicized Federal Court challenge provided EIDN with a platform to engage
extensively with media,106 and in doing so to centre the voices of detainees and their family
members. EIDN focused its messaging on the need for a limit on the length of detentions, while
also drawing attention to the violations of international human rights law inherent in the
immigration detention system, and the many deaths that have occurred under the CBSA’s watch.107
Instead of hearing exclusively from legal actors in media coverage, centering the voices of
detainees, family members, and Mr. Brown himself, humanized the issue and demonstrated the
toll that indefinite detention takes on the mental health of individual detainees, as well as the
families whose lives are violently interrupted by the immigration detention system.108 Backed by
the legitimacy that came with being a party to the litigation, EIDN was in a position to frame the
discourse surrounding the legal challenge, and infuse the demands of the network into public
consciousness on a larger scale. This opportunity to define the problems associated with
immigration detention exemplifies one way that litigation efforts can be complimentary, rather
than antithetical, to grassroots organizing.
Political effects of the litigation emerged shortly after the release of the decision, with the
Immigration and Refugee Board announcing plans to “audit” the detention reviews of long-term
detainees. Citing Brown, which clarified the requirements of constitutional detention,109 the IRB
stated that depriving liberty requires them to “be proactive in identifying and pursuing
opportunities for improvement.”110 A report of the external audit was released in July 2018.111 The
report found that “in a significant number of [reviewed] hearings and decisions, there were notable
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discrepancies between the expectations articulated by the courts and the practice of the ID,”112
especially in “very” long-term detention cases, and noted that “there is cause for concern to the
extent that the courts have been critical of practices which the audit found to be present in many
of the files reviewed.”113 The audit report identified with concern many of the same issues with
the review process that were raised by EIDN and Mr. Brown at Federal Court, including the
tendency for the onus to shift to detainees to justify their own release.114 The report identified areas
where change is required to meet Charter and procedural fairness requirements set out in Brown
and other jurisprudence.115
Throughout the litigation process, EIDN was able to frame immigration detention as violent,
inhumane, and arbitrary. In the aftermath of the Brown challenge, along with other recent litigation
and advocacy,116 it has become difficult to dismiss long-term detention as simply the collateral
damage of a neutral administrative process. Post-Brown, “there are very few long-term
detainees”117 and “more people being released on conditions,” which are often stringent. Baqi said:
“I don’t know if I’d call it a victory, but it’s movement. I think the government’s scared, and was
scared of this litigation, and put a lot of resources into it.” Ahead of the litigation, detainee
organizers had the government’s feet held firmly to the fire, and the Federal Court challenge further
intensified this pressure.
2. LITIGATION LIMITATIONS
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Faraday cautions that “by framing social conflicts in terms of legal rights, the discourse
presupposes a legal solution,”118 and as EIDN’s experience demonstrates, the legal system is
largely unable to provide the types of change sought by social movements.
i. Resource Intensity
Baqi made it clear that litigation was never “supposed to be the central strategy” of EIDN’s
campaign. She bemoaned the fact that it became so central “because litigation takes so many
resources and time … . It happens at the expense of mobilizing for other reasons.” Elizabeth
Schneider echoes her concerns, suggesting that “the concreteness and immediacy of legal struggle
tends to subsume the more diffuse role of political organizing and education”119 and cautions that
“the articulation of a right can, despite a movement’s best efforts, put the focus of immediate
political struggle on winning the right in court,” to the detriment of other organizing and educating
efforts.120 Given that a victory in court does not dismantle the oppressive social and economic
systems that movements are born from, this monopolization of resources is a problematic
consequence of litigation that can limit capacity to engage in other necessary work. While Faraday
emphasizes the “need for extralegal political activity in order to give legal entitlements any
substantive meaning,”121 the incredible human and financial resource drain created by litigation
makes this a challenge.
Because of the intense resource demands of litigation, movements may adopt a cautious
approach to engaging in litigation to further social change. Steven Barkan argues that “[g]iven the
particular needs and goals of a social movement organization, the probable costs of a potential …
case in time, energy, and money must not outweigh the possible advantages of litigation.”122
Resource constraints pose a particular challenge for grassroots organizations like EIDN, which has
no paid staff, operating budget, or defined leadership. As Baqi recounted: “We were very poorly
resourced, … and even getting transcripts and experts [was challenging].” Test case funding from
Legal Aid Ontario covered some of co-counsel Swathi Sekhar’s legal fees, but that was after the
motion for leave had been filed on a pro bono basis. Baqi was retained through her pre-existing
clinic job, which devoted “a lot of resources” to allow her to represent EIDN. Even so, the legal
team contributed a significant amount of uncompensated time to the challenge.
Baqi recounted the frustrating reality of working on a “dream case” that aligned closely with
her politics while feeling completely overwhelmed “for four months straight” due to the allconsuming nature of the challenge and the sheer volume of work. She said that while working
countless hours of unpaid overtime was ultimately worthwhile, “it was not sustainable.” Similarly,
while EIDN secured limited funding to compensate the detainees and family members who
provided affidavit evidence, it was insufficient to fully account for the time and emotional energy
spent participating in the challenge.
ii. Narrowness of the Law
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Baqi explained that the legal strategy used to challenge the detention regime was “really
interesting, but also really frustrating … because the law is so narrow.” One of the trade-offs of
being granted third party standing was being forced to play by the rules of the legal system, which
meant making palatable, legally-supportable arguments, even when they did not map on to the
demands and political principles of the network; in order to be taken seriously within the
courtroom, much of EIDN’s political vision had to be checked at the door. Baqi illustrated this
using EIDN’s key demand of a ninety-day limit on detentions:
I don’t think there would have been a legal basis to really say that, because we are
relying on precedent, and other jurisdictions … . So, we had to frame the demand for
release after ninety days into a presumptive period of ninety days. After the ninety
days the idea is that the person should be released, but the state would be able to rebut
that presumption … . Certainly the government wouldn’t explicitly acknowledge this,
but when you’re talking about hugely marginalized, racialized, predominantly Black
migrants that are in detention, conveniently the government always has a reason to
rebut that presumption … and so practically speaking, you know I’m not confident that
[a presumptive period] would actually do very much in the lives of people facing
detention, short of a socio-political change in how racialized migrants are viewed and
treated.
It was frustrating to water down EIDN’s central political demand of a ninety-day limit on
detentions, especially because, as Baqi notes, organizers with the campaign firmly believed that
“people should not be detained for immigration purposes period.”
Litigating on behalf of immigration detainees is an uphill and contradictory battle as it
involves an appeal for understanding and sympathy from a legal system that limits the rights and
entitlements of non-citizens at every turn. The understanding that non-citizens do not have an
unqualified right to enter and remain in Canada is fundamental to immigration law,123 which Baqi
argues has created a “different rights regime for non-citizens … especially around detention.”
Moreover, because immigration detention in Canada is characterized by the government as an
administrative process, and not a punitive one,124 there exists a disconnect between the legal
understanding of detention and the harsh lived realities of immigration detainees. Unlike in a
criminal law context, Baqi argued:
[I]n the immigration context, there’s not even space to bring [race and racial profiling]
up, because immigration detention and deportation are legally not seen as punishment,
so it’s not punitive, it’s fully administrative [and, theoretically] you’re not being
targeted in anyway. If detention is not even seen as punishment, how do you even
make these arguments?
iii. Erasure of Broader Context
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For Baqi, the absence of a discussion about systemic racism was “the thing that was really
maddening about this whole piece.” Though “almost every single one of the people who are in
long-term detention is Black,”125 race remained the “giant elephant in the room.” At a certain point
in the challenge, Baqi remembers the process began to feel pointless because so much broader
context, specifically around race, borders, and criminalization, was silenced: “[T]hat’s what
borders are about, that’s what control of these Black bodies is about, that’s what deprivation of
liberty without real accountability is about … and it’s nowhere to be seen in any of this.”
Reference to the broader social and political context in which the immigration detention
regime operates was similarly silenced throughout the entire court process. As Baqi acknowledged,
“we’re on stolen [Indigenous] land, these are colonial borders, this is a colonial government who
has imperial interests around the world that displace people,” yet within the courtroom, no space
existed to question Canada’s authority to detain migrants on this territory, nor its role in creating
conditions of displacement around the world. Context critical to understanding immigration
detention as part of a violent and oppressive system, instead of the neutral bureaucratic
administration of Canadian immigration law, was consequently missing from the legal argument.

V. CONCLUSION
A dialectical relationship exists between legal rights and political organizing, and it is too simple
to dismiss the use of litigation as a tool for social movements because of the “politically
debilitating”126 potential of relying on rights claims. Schneider argues we should recognize the
“affirming, expressive, and creative aspects of rights claims,” while being critical of the role and
potential of legal challenges.127 Heffernan et al echo this critical embrace of law as a tool for social
change, arguing that “while it involves risks, litigation is a valid and at times necessary field of
engagement both as a process of movement building and as a defence of core entitlements.”128
While legal challenges alone “are not a basis for building a sustained political movement, nor
can rights claims perform the task of social reconstruction,”129 engaging in litigation was valuable
for EIDN. The process granted value and legitimacy to the lives of immigration detainees, captured
the attention of media and government, consolidated support for the campaign, and allowed the
voices and perspectives of detainees to be heard before the court.
The parties are currently in the process of filing an application for leave to appeal the decision
to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, regardless of whether Mr. Brown and EIDN ultimately
find legal success, the work of dismantling the systems that facilitate the surveillance,
criminalization, and detention of migrants will be far from over. The trajectory of the End
Immigration Detention Network reinforces the importance of building collective power within
social movements and being cautious of rights granted from within the vacuum of the legal system.
Most importantly, EIDN’s experience demonstrates that to bring an end to both indefinite
detention and the broader structures that uphold the Canadian immigration detention regime,
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litigation must necessarily be only one tool, carefully selected and wielded, in an overall strategy
for change.
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